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ABSTRACT
What factors and developments have fuelled the „cartelisation“ of capital markets? - to the extent of 
the rigging of EURIBOR and LIBOR rates? In what ways can EURIBOR and LIBOR rate rigging 
practices be addressed?
How and why have offshore markets expanded to the degree and extent to which they exist today – 
this partly being explained through the multiplier effect, as well as the fact that onshore (national) 
regulations have boosted and facilitated the growth of offshore financial centers? This paper is not 
only aimed at addressing these issues and developments, but also highlights why (even though) the 
need for de regulation of national capital markets is justified, the converse appears to apply to the 
liberalisation  of  external  capital  markets.  Furthermore,  the  liberalisation  of  global  and  external 
capital  markets  has  provided the impetus  and justification for  the  need  to  de regulate  national 
capital markets.
The need and concern for increased regulation of bond, equity markets, as well as other complex 
financial  instruments  which  can  be  traded  in  OTC  (Over-  the-Counter)  derivatives  markets  is 
evidenced by Basel III's focus. „Cartelisation“ and organised activities relating to rate rigging in 
global capital markets have been evidenced recently by sophisticated EURIBOR and LIBOR rate 
rigging practices and occurences.
Key Words:  EURIBOR (Euro Inter-Bank Offered Rate), LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered 
Rate), de regulation, monetary policies, rate rigging, equity, bond markets, 
derivatives, capital markets, liberalisation
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A. Introduction
Pressures for the de regulation of national capital markets and calls for less restrictions in respect of 
capital  controls  in  national  capital  markets,  have  increased  over  the  years  in  response  to  the 
liberalization of global financial capital markets. The liberalization of global capital markets, as 
well as differences in the levels and extents of regulatory and capital controls which operate within 
banks' national borders, have also impacted the competitive positions of banks in external markets.
Whilst  the  growth  of  markets,  such  as  the  Eurodollar  market,  can  be  explained  through  the 
multiplier concept, some of the basic characteristics of the Eurodollar market which include:
1) Freedom from regulations that constitute a problem of most national markets
2) Its international scope and dimension
have also contributed to its popularity and attractiveness for investors since such offshore markets 
provide cheaper and more profitable services to these investors at lower cost. Furthermore, a huge 
level of resources may indeed have migrated from onshore to offshore destinations but for the fact 
that:
− offshore depositors have to bear additional risks in taxes in addition to inconveniences with 
deposits outside their home country
− Size, credit quality which may restrict some firms from accessing offshore markets.
According  to  D'Arista1,  two  developments  which  have  dominated  how financial  markets  were 
liberalized, are as follows:
− The rise of the Eurocurrency markets in the 1960s
− The shift from banks to port folio investment in the 1980s.
„The waves of capital flows into the United States, and subsequently into Germany, Switzerland, and other European 
countries  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s,  demonstrate  how  effectively  the  Eurocurrency  markets  are  able  to 
circumvent capital controls by making it possible for participants to change the currency denomination of loans and 
investments outside national markets in response to changes in interest rates, and subsequently (to) changes in exchange 
rates.“2
1 J D'Arista, „Financial Regulation in a Liberalized Global Environment“ in International Capital Markets : Systems 
in Transition (eds J Eatwell and L Taylor) 2002 at page 76
2 Ibid at page 77
3Hence Eurocurrency markets have not only facilitated the undermining of regulatory strategies – 
given their ability to circumvent national capital controls and regulations, but have also affected 
central  banks'  abilities  to  effectively  implement  monetary  policies.  Whilst  these  constitute 
consequences of negative impacts of liberalization, a more lethal consequence has also emerged 
over the years : the rigging of LIBOR and EURIBOR.
In  demonstrating  the  extent  of  the  „cartelisation“  and  manipulation  of  such  rates,  the  ensuing 
section will commence by providing definitions of  LIBOR and EURIBOR.
B. Definitions Attributed to LIBOR and EURIBOR and Self Regulation
Libor,  the  London  Inter-Bank  Offered  Rate,  is  defined  as  „the  benchmark  interest  rate  that 
underpins  trillions  of  loans,  credit  cards,  mortgages  and derivatives  around the  world“3,  whilst 
Euribor is the Euro Inter-Bank Offered Rate - which is also of vital significance given its role in 
setting borrowing rates for trillions worth in mortgages, loans and credit cards.
− LIBOR  and  EURIBOR  have  different  definitions,  which  makes  the  possibility  of  rate  rigging  different. 
However, they have one feature in common: they are calculated from contributions with in-built conflicts of 
interest and this characteristic is not compatible with the ambition of rebuilding  integrity and trust in our 
financial system.4
Whilst LIBOR is considered to „reflect the cost of borrowing of the contributing bank“,  EURIBOR 
on the other hand, is considered to „reflect the contributing bank’s conviction about the cost at 
which a prime bank (i.e. not necessarily the contributing bank itself) would offer term deposits to 
another prime bank.“5 Furthermore, the The London Inter-Bank Offer Rate is considered to be „the 
average rate at which a leading bank can obtain unsecured funding in the London interbank market 
for a given period, in a given currency.“6
Two ways whereby (it is argued that) corporations are said to be exposed to LIBOR and EURIBOR 
rates include:7
− Through LIBOR (or EURIBOR) related borrowings.
− The use of LIBOR and EURIBOR as reference rates in many derivative products, including 
swaps.
At present, LIBOR has 18 contributing banks and EURO EURIBOR has 44. 
3 See Merco Press,  „Euro zone to Tighten Financial Regulation following the Libor Rigging Scandal“ 
<http://en.mercopress.com/2012/07/09/euro-zone-to-tighten-financial-regulation-following-the-libor-rigging-
scandal>
4 See Remarks by Thierry Philipponnat , Secretary General of Finance Watch, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY AFFAIRS of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Public Hearing on  Tackling the culture of market 
manipulation, Sept 2012. Furthermore, he adds that the different definitions of EURIBOR and LIBOR rates reflects 
the fact that they were established by different private bodies pursuing different, and often competing, interests.
5 ibid
6  Treasury  Today,   „LIBOR  Troubles:  What  Should  You  be  Doing?“  <http://treasurytoday.com/2012/07/libor-
fixing>„It is also to be noted it is a lending (offer) rate not a deposit (bid) rate and is calculated by averaging the 
middle two quartiles of the rates submitted on a daily basis by a panel of 16 banks to the BBA (British Banking 
Association). The top and bottom quartiles are discarded.“
7 See ibid
4Self Regulation : LIBOR and EURIBOR 
The self regulatory nature of LIBOR is illustrated by the fact that „it is not only presided over by 
the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), a private banking trade and lobby group“,  but also the fact 
that  eighteen  of  the  world’s  largest  banks  „which  submit  loan  data  to  the  Libor  board  every 
morning, to help set the global rate to which their own trading bets are tied“, also control the BBA.
As a result of the self regulatory nature of LIBOR, regulatory capture does not only constitute the 
inevitable consequence, but also the frequent occurence of practices attributed to a system void of 
adequate levels of accountability and transparency, as well as one embroiled in associated corrupt 
practices  and  conflicts  of  interests.  Lack  of  accountability  not  only  facilitates  an  environment 
whereby high degrees of conflicts of interests are encouraged, but also one whereby the „passing of 
the buck“ results in the inability to bring to book (as well as pin point) the principal offenders. It is 
contended by several sources that the LIBOR and EURIBOR rate rigging scandals commenced as 
far back as 2005, whilst it is also said to have had its roots as far back as 2007 – particularly during 
the period culminating in the Financial Crisis. Even though concerns and suspicions of rate rigging 
practices had been raised as far back as 2007, these calls and concerns were evidently ignored – 
such that the rate rigging crisis has escalated to the levels which presently persist.
As stated by Philipponnat:
“Benchmarks with a large public impact should not be left purely to private interests.
“The  idea  of  ‘effective  self-regulation’ has  proven  over  and  over  again  to  be  an  
oxymoron in  financial  services and is not the way to restore the public’s profoundly  
shaken trust in the fairness of financial activities.”8
Recent  discoveries  not  only point  to  revelations  that  a  group of  international  banks  have  been 
manipulating interest rates for years9 What is even more serious is the fact that some banks involved 
in  the  cartelisation  process,  are  those  responsible  for  setting  and calculating  the  LIBOR rates. 
Whilst two traders have recently been made scapegoats for the regulatory failures and gaps in the 
rate rigging process,10 it is becoming more likely that other participants in the rate rigging process 
(bankers inclusive), will be placed under pressure to disclose their involvements in the cartelisation 
process.
C. Recent Measures and Proposals Aimed at Addressing the Rate Rigging Scandal
It is rightly stated11 that the LIBOR's definition imposes more demanding requirements than the 
EURIBOR whilst the number of contributing banks to the EURIBOR rates determination, makes it 
8 Finance Watch, „Finance Watch Response to Parliament on LIBOR and EURIBOR“ <http://www.finance-
watch.org/2012/09/finance-watch-response-to-parliament-on-libor-and-euribor/>
9 See Spielgel, „The Cartel Behind the Scenes in the Libor Interest Rate Scandal“ 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-libor-scandal-could-cost-leading-global-banks-billions-a-
847453.html>
10 "Derivatives traders are also believed to have agreed upon the difference between the buy and sell prices (spreads) 
of derivatives, thereby selling these financial instruments to customers under conditions that were not customary in 
the market," says the Swiss Competition Commission, which is also investigating possible cartels.“ ibid
11 See Remarks by Thierry Philipponnat , Secretary General of Finance Watch, COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY AFFAIRS of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Public Hearing on  Tackling the culture of market 
manipulation, Sept 2012 at page 3 of 5
5less likely for rate manipulating practices to occur. Greater accountability,  it  could therefore be 
argued, would be fostered, if the number of major contributing banks to the LIBOR rates were 
increased. 
Greater consistency in the definitions applicable to LIBOR and EURIBOR, basing LIBOR and 
EURIBOR on effective rates,12 making banks, managers, operators responsible for their actions, 
have also been proposed.13
Further, external regulatory oversight of benchmark setting, as well as greater use of transaction 
data, have also been put forward.14
The impact of LIBOR and EURIBOR rates on millions of lives can be illustrated thus:
− The daily Libor rate, which is supposed to measure the average cost of short-term loans between major banks, 
determines the interest rates for loans and investments that affect hundreds of millions of people around the 
world.Libor and Euribor , are used to set the borrowing rates for $10 trillion in mortgages, student loans and 
credit cards. Some 90 percent of US commercial and mortgage loans are said to be linked to the index.Libor 
influences an estimated $360 trillion of loans and credit default swaps. It impacts futures contracts traded on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with a notational value of more than $564 trillion.15
It would therefore not only be in the public's interest, but also the interest of global and economic 
stabililty (and a means of restoring the credibility of the LIBOR and EURIBOR rates - on which 
many investors and markets rely), if  measures and reforms aimed at addressing the rate rigging 
practices, could be effectively implemented.
D. Addressing Policy Concerns About  the Impacts of Eurocurrency Markets: Monetary 
Setting Policies
The impacts of Eurocurrency markets on monetary setting policies and banks' competitive positions 
have also been highlighted. How can regulation be effectively implemented to ensure that they are 
not too rigid (such as to place banks at competitively disadvantaged positions in external markets) 
whilst not being too lax (such that effective monitoring, compliance and enforcement mechanisms 
are impeded)?
In addressing the issue of monetary policy setting, the challenges faced by the U.S Fed Reserve 
embraces the admission by several sources that current fiscal and monetary policies in the U.S are 
not feasible,16 as well as the argument that the Federal Reserve's range of powers are too wide. The 
12 As well as making contributions reflect financial reality, basing LIBOR and EURIBOR on effective rates is also said 
to  provide less avenues whereby rate manipulation could occur ; see ibid
13 See ibid at pages 3 - 5
14 Finance Watch, „Finance Watch Response to Parliament on LIBOR and EURIBOR“ <http://www.finance-
watch.org/2012/09/finance-watch-response-to-parliament-on-libor-and-euribor/>
15 Global Research, „Libor Scandal Exposes Banks’ Rigging of Global Rates“ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/libor-
scandal-exposes-banks-rigging-of-global-rates/31783>  „The Libor and Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) are 
used worldwide as the benchmark rates for financial  transactions worth hundreds of trillions of euros.  When a 
savings bank issues a loan to a business at a variable interest rate, the loan agreement is based on the Euribor. "In 
many cases, the Euribor is even the key guideline for the structuring of call money," says Falko Fecht, a professor at 
the Frankfurt School of Finance, referring to overnight and other such short-term loans. In Spain, in particular, tens 
of thousands of construction loans are based on the Euribor, while millions of mortgage loans in the United States 
are pegged to the Libor rate.“
16  Compare to the  intended European Monetary Union Framework:  „On the central bank side, the maintenance of 
6Federal Reserve is considered to have a role which encrouches and interferes with that of legislature 
and the executive – particularly in job creation issues which could impede the pace of achievement 
of fiscal policy objectives.
In highlighting several reforms which should be implemented at the Federal Reserve, some reforms 
(which include the following) are highlighted:17
− That firstly, the Fed’s dual mandate for monetary policy should be eliminated. „While it is 
clearly important for national economic policy to be designed to achieve “full employment” 
-  which  varies  over  time  based  on  domestic  and  global  conditions  and  to  keep 
unemployment and underemployment as low as possible, that this should not be the Fed’ 
Reserve's job.
− That the Fed’s monetary policy charge should be to promote relatively stable prices and 
reasonable long-term interest rates. By doing so, it is further argued, it can help create an 
economic environment that will facilitate economic growth and job creation.
− Instead of the Fed, Congress and the president should be working together to address the 
many structural and sustainability challenges that directly impact economic growth and job 
creation.“
Even though it  is  further  added that  whilst  „the  Fed needs  to  provide  reasonable transparency 
regarding  its  decisions  on  monetary  policy,  after  those  decisions  have  been  made,  it  is  also 
mentioned that  it  should  be  able  to  conduct  its  research  and deliberations  on  monetary policy 
without being subject to audit, in order to facilitate sound and nonpolitical decision-making“. Given 
the recent LIBOR and EURIBOR scandals, should the Fed really be exempt from audits? Indeed, 
should any federal regulator or supervisor be exempt from audits?
E. Conclusion
In the wake of the EURIBOR and LIBOR rate rigging scandals, the British Bankers Association in 
September 2012 indicated its willingness to give up its role in setting LIBOR rates. Whether such a 
role is assigned to another body does not constitute the crucial issue since the new authority (should 
the BBA eventually give up its role) could still be controlled or influenced by the 18 contributing 
banks which „which submit loan data to the Libor board every morning, as well as help set the 
global rate to which their own trading bets are tied.“ In other words, the system of self regulation 
which currently governs the BBA's operations, as well as EURIBOR procedures, urgently needs to 
be reviewed.
price  stability  over  the  medium-term  is  the  most  important  contribution  that  monetary  policy  can  make  to 
sustainable growth, employment, and  social cohesion. On the fiscal side, the institutional framework reflects our 
long-standing experience that sound and sustainable fiscal policies are in turn fundamental to fostering longer-term 
sustainable economic growth. 
Following these principles, monetary and fiscal policies are mutually re-enforcing. Solid fiscal policy is conducive 
to a macroeconomic environment that facilitates the task of a stability-oriented central bank. At the same time, 
credible  monetary  policy  contributes  to  a  smooth  conduct  of  fiscal  policies  by  guaranteeing  stable  inflation 
expectations and low inflation risk premia,  which is  in turn beneficial  for  the level  and volatility of long-term 
government bond yields and therewith sovereign financing costs. „ See ECB, „Monetary Policy at Crisis Times“, 
Lecture by Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the International Center for Monetary and 
Banking Studies, Geneva, 20 February 2012 <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120220.en.html>
17 Financial Executive  „The Role of the Fed Reserve „
<http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/Financial-Executive-Magazine/2012_03/The-Role-of-the-
Federal-Reserve.aspx the Fed Reserve>
7Further, bank regulators and banks (managers and executives) need to be engaged on a greater level 
(than at  present)  in the calculations of LIBOR and EURIBOR rates, rather than the process of 
merely designating the bench mark rate determination to money market traders. Such traders are 
considered to exhibit higher tendencies of conflicts of interests.18
Whilst penalties and fines have been imposed on those banks involved in the recent „cartelisation“ 
and rate  rigging  scandals,  the  cost  of  rate  rigging  (inclusive  of  those  costs  to  tax  payers),   is 
considered  to  be  proportionately  high  relatively  to  those  fines.  Further,  the  passiveness  and 
indifference of many national regulators and supervisors to rate rigging suspicions and practices 
constitutes a cause for concern. Hence, greater accountability and responsibility for rate rigging 
practices would need to embrace,  more importantly,  the involvement of national regulators and 
supervisors. Whilst the free market is considered by some to be capable of regulating itself and 
evolving  with  technological  and  global  developments,  some  form of  policing  (in  the  form of 
adequately balanced regulation) is required to ensure that market participants do not exploit those 
opportunities which arise owing to insufficient (or lack of) regulatory controls.
The predecessors to Basel III were often criticised for the failure to address system wide risks – 
hence it is to be commended that Basel III places some degree of focus on such risks.
18  „An invitation to manipulate, according to the Bafin chief.“ See  Spielgel, „The Cartel Behind the Scenes in the 
Libor Interest Rate Scandal“ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-libor-scandal-could-cost-leading-
global-banks-billions-a-847453.html>
8References
 Bank for International Settlements, Progress Report on Basel III Implementation October 2012 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs232.htm>
COMMITTEE  ON  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  AFFAIRS  of  the  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT Public Hearing on  Tackling the culture of market manipulation, Sept 2012
D'Arista, J.  „Financial Regulation in a Liberalized Global Environment“ in International Capital  
Markets : Systems in Transition (eds J Eatwell and L Taylor) 2002, University of Cambridge
ECB, „Monetary Policy at Crisis Times“, Lecture by Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board 
of the ECB, at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, 20 February 
2012 <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120220.en.html>
Financial Executive, „The Role of the Fed Reserve „ March 2012
<http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/Financial-Executive-Magazine/2012_03/The-
Role-of-the-Federal-Reserve.aspx the Fed Reserve>
Finance  Watch,  „Finance  Watch  Response  to  Parliament  on  LIBOR  and  EURIBOR“ 
<http://www.finance-watch.org/2012/09/finance-watch-response-to-parliament-on-libor-and-
euribor/>
Global  Research,  „Libor  Scandal  Exposes  Banks’  Rigging  of  Global  Rates“ 
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/libor-scandal-exposes-banks-rigging-of-global-rates/31783>
Merco Press,  „Euro zone to Tighten Financial Regulation following the Libor Rigging Scandal“ 
<http://en.mercopress.com/2012/07/09/euro-zone-to-tighten-financial-regulation-following-the-
libor-rigging-scandal>
Spielgel,  „The  Cartel  Behind  the  Scenes  in  the  Libor  Interest  Rate  Scandal“ 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-libor-scandal-could-cost-leading-global-banks-
billions-a-847453.html>
Treasury  Today,   „LIBOR  Troubles:  What  Should  You  be  Doing?“ 
<http://treasurytoday.com/2012/07/libor-fixing>
